Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development

In the continuing discussion on migration and development, the vulnerability of all migrant groups to exploitation and mistreatment in host countries has been highlighted along with an emphasis on protecting their rights. However, xenophobia has not yet received explicit attention although anti-migrant sentiments and practices are clearly on the rise even in receiving countries in developing regions. Despite gaps in existing empirical work, research and anecdotal evidence exposes pervasive forms of discrimination, hostility, and violence experienced by migrant communities, with the latter becoming easy scapegoats for various social problems in host countries. This study attempts to insert xenophobia in this debate on migration and development by examining the growth of this phenomenon in host countries in the South. It provides short accounts of xenophobia witnessed in recent times in five countries including South Africa, India, Malaysia, Libya, and Thailand. The ambiguity surrounding the concept is discussed and crucial features that define xenophobia are outlined. A variety of methods to study it are likewise identified. Using a wide range of examples from diverse contexts, the paper explores possible reasons for the intensification of xenophobia. The final sections of the paper briefly outline the developmental consequences of rampant xenophobia for migrant and host populations while examining policy options to tackle it

No. 67: Migrant Entrepreneurship, Collective Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa

The remarkable growth of informal migrant entrepreneurship in South Africa since 1990 would have been much lauded had it not been for the striking detail that the actors in question are seen as “foreigners” or “outsiders”. As such, they are uniformly viewed as undesirable and disadvantaging poor South African citizens. The growing presence of migrants in the informal sector has created various tensions in South Africa, including in government circles, ignoring the fact that in the free market economy of South Africa, immigrants and refugees, like citizens and commercial enterprises, would otherwise enjoy the freedom to establish, operate and expand their businesses. The xenophobic anti-immigrant violence that swept South Africa in May 2008 led to the deaths of over 70 people, seriously injured 400 and displaced as many as 100,000 from their communities. A large number of migrant-owned businesses were also destroyed in the mayhem. Looting, burning and destruction of business property was widespread and many migrant entrepreneurs were among those hounded out of their communities. Such actions did not stop after May 2008, however. If anything, they have become more insidious and pervasive. South Africa provides an important case study of how citizen attitudes and behaviours materially affect the business climate for migrant entrepreneurs. Trying to run a business in the informal economy is an especially hazardous undertaking in South Africa. First, the state (both central and municipal) has adopted a protectionist position, which leads to various regulatory and policing responses that seek to disadvantage, if not eliminate, migrant entrepreneurship. Second, the police run their own protection (or non-harassment) rackets to benefit financially from those able to pay. Third, South African competitors, particularly in the spaza sector, have increasingly adopted a strategy of using violence to intimidate and drive migrant entrepreneurs out of an area. And fourth, a minority of citizens have turned hostile attitudes towards migrants and refugees into violent actions by forcibly shutting down migrant-owned businesses and attacking their owners and employees. Underlying all of these responses is a strong xenophobic undertow. National attitudinal surveys by SAMP, as well as in-depth qualitative research and the personal testimony of many migrants, confirm that many South Africans hold deep-rooted negative opinions about migrants and migrant entrepreneurs. In the face of this body of evidence, claims by prominent political figures that xenophobia does not exist in South Africa ring extremely hollow. South Africans make clear distinctions between African migrants of different nationalities, with migrants from countries including Somalia and Zimbabwe viewed far less favourably than those from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Since many informal migrant entrepreneurs are from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Somalia and the DRC, they are singled out for harsh treatment. SAMP asked South Africans how likely they would be to take part in collective action against the presence of migrants and found 25% were likely to prevent a migrant from operating a business in their area. The survey results revealed that around one in every ten South Africans was predisposed to turn hostile attitudes into violent actions. This may seem a relatively low proportion in light of the prevalence of negative attitudes but multiplied it suggests that 3.8 million (out of an adult population of around 35 million) South Africans would be prepared to use violent means to rid their neighbourhoods of foreign migrants. Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops have been especially common features of collective violence over the past several years. Some of this violence is obviously motivated primarily by criminality, especially robberies and looting, but to attribute all attacks to criminal motivation is reductionist and misleading. In general, the weak structural and social position of “foreigners” in localized areas as “outsiders”, combined with limited access to protection and justice, makes them more vulnerable to criminal attack. Acts of collective violence include (a) written or verbal threats and insults directed at migrant entrepreneurs; (b) public intimidation of migrant entrepreneurs through protests or marches or other similar collective actions; (c) involuntary migrant shop closures; (d) direct physical violence against migrant store owners or their employees; (e) looting of store contents; (f) damage to the physical structure of shops, especially through arson; (g) damage or destruction of other property belonging to migrant traders, including homes and cars; (h) temporary or permanent forced displacement of migrant entrepreneurs and their families; and (i) extortion for protection by local leaders, police and residents. Looting of store goods and damage to the stores were easily the most common types of action recorded. While xenophobic views and actions are not espoused or approved of by all local residents of affected settlements, their prevalence suggests that they do enjoy sufficient support and that there are few deterrents. Far from reducing xenophobia, claims that collective violence against migrant businesses are simply acts of criminality legitimize and may even incite further violence. There is also the prejudiced, xenophobic idea that non-citizens are not entitled to anything – not police protection and certainly not to run a small business, even if it is enshrined in law and generated through their own initiative. The bigger picture, which includes the threat to all small-scale traders posed by supermarkets’ increasing dominance, is lost as the focus turns to curtailing migrant entrepreneurship in place of the real, urgent need to support opportunities for all small entrepreneurs in marginal settlements through incentives and programmes. This report focuses on the chronology and geography of collective violence against migrant entrepreneurs since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994. The overall aim of the research was to document and create a chronological account of attacks on migrant businesses, to categorise the types and frequency of attacks and to map the locations where such events occurred. The incidents discussed involve the intentional and spontaneous participation of groups of people in acts of collective violence against migrant businesses. Three distinct criteria, singly or in combination, were used for including an incident as part of the analysis: first, the scale of damage had to be extensive, affecting a number of businesses; second, there had to have been displacement of and injuries to business owners; and third, the violence had to have been perpetrated by groups rather than individuals. The analysis revealed the following about attacks on migrant entrepreneurs: There has been a marked pattern of escalation over time. Pre-2005 incidents constitute less than 5% of recorded episodes. A definite upswing is seen from 2006 onwards, with the sharpest growth occurring after 2008. Excluding events in May 2008, nearly 90% of recorded episodes of group violence against migrant businesses occurred since the beginning of 2008. The five years with the largest number of incidents were from 2010 to 2014. Collective violence targeting migrant entrepreneurs is no longer confined to a few isolated locations. Since 2005, the majority of South African provinces have been touched by such collective violence. However, the Western Cape and Gauteng have experienced the highest levels of violence. The overall number of affected provinces and localities has increased considerably since 2005 and the majority of provinces have witnessed repeated incidents since 2009. Since 2009, at least 32 distinct locations have witnessed two or more episodes of group violence. The scale of the attacks is sometimes sizeable and can spill over into neighbouring settlements. Looting and vandalism of migrant-owned shops have been especially common features of collective violence. These actions, though criminal, may appear less grave when compared to severe injuries and loss of lives, but they cannot be treated as inconsequential as they impose unwarranted hardships on migrant entrepreneurs through partial or complete loss of stock and destruction of their shops and investments. Collective violence against migrant businesses also impacts negatively on South African citizens and businesses. Wholesalers, retailers and suppliers are affected when migrant business activities are disrupted or destroyed. Also, a significant proportion of migrant businesses rent business spaces from South African property owners, who lose rental income when their tenants are expelled or their premises are vandalized. Other losers include poor local consumers who are forced to buy more expensive goods from larger stores or face the inconvenience of travelling longer distances to purchase necessities. The opinions of politicians and officials about migrant entrepreneurs often seem indistinguishable from the intolerant views of ordinary citizens and this, in turn, reinforces negative beliefs and ideas in the populace at large. Their excusing attacks on migrant entrepreneurs as unrelated to xenophobia are contradicted by the details of many of these attacks. What makes the official position especially ironic is when officials themselves articulate sentiments that reproduce the xenophobic myths that they claim do not exist. Failure to curb the situation by consistently restraining offenders and imposing stringent penalties on collective violence only expands the elements of “opportunism” attached to such acts, encouraging others to participate, and reinforcing the unprotected position of migrants and refugees as outsiders” in affected areas

No. 66: Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism

Violent xenophobia has become a regular feature of South African life. Everyday animosity frequently spills over into violence against individual migrants and refugees and their economic enterprises. Some of these incidents reach the scrutiny of the media and officialdom, but most remain invisible and unremarked. The fact that most of the violence occurs in marginal urban locations of informal settlements, townships and inner-city suburbs in South Africa has prompted intense debate over the nomenclature and identification of the underlying causes. Explanations for the large-scale anti-migrant violence that swept the country in May 2008, and continues in more isolated and sporadic fashion through to the present day, fall into three general categories: “xenophobia denialism”, “xenophobia minimalism” and “xenophobia realism.” The denialists reject the argument that xenophobia plays any role in violence against migrants and refugees. The South African government, initially bewildered by the unexpectedness and ferocity of the May 2008 violence, settled on an official position that the deaths, destruction and displacement were the work of criminal elements in the affected areas. This argument that attacks on migrants and refugees are simply acts of criminality, not xenophobia, is now state orthodoxy. Xenophobia denialism has also shaped official South African responses to criticism from the international community. Violence perpetrated by the police and South African citizens continues to be explained away by politicians as criminal acts by isolated, anti-social elements. The government’s position has been echoed by some researchers and political commentators who suggest that only a very small group of individuals engage in such acts and that these are not symptomatic of wider prejudice against migrants within South African society. Another form of denialism shifts the blame from xenophobia to the state’s dereliction of its duties, particularly its failure to control borders. According to this view, the problem is that the state has not seriously engaged with the “foreign threat.” It is difficult to see how South Africa’s draconian border and immigration controls can be considered either soft or lenient. The post-apartheid state has intensified border and immigration enforcement and, even at the height of the 2008 violence, officials were deporting displaced victims they claimed had entered South Africa illegally. State agencies have typically focused on identifying irregular migrants among victims of violence and deporting them, reinforcing the biases and prejudices that fuelled the violence to begin with. The xenophobia minimalists also eschew it as an explanation for violence against migrants and refugees, seeing it instead as an epiphenomenon or symptom of a deeper malaise. This is a particularly prevalent tendency amongst neo-marxist scholars seeking a materialist explanation for the violence, which they view as the outworking of structural economic inequalities and the capture of the African National Congress by neoliberalism, with the consequent inability of the state to effect a fundamental transformation and redistribution of wealth and resources in the country. The minimalists essentially argue that although xenophobia might exist, it is an epiphenomenon that does not get at the root causes of violence. One strand of minimalism sees the violence as a signifier of a broader, deepening social crisis in South Africa tied to intense competition for scarce resources such as jobs, shelter and services. According to this view, the effects of the inadequate post-apartheid transition have been felt most acutely in marginal urban locations where much of the violence has occurred and where difference has become the site around which the palpable anger and frustrations of those left out has been expressed. Certainly, the spatial incidence of violence in May 2008 was strongly correlated with the geography of poverty. But this simply begs the question of why not all poor areas (including many in which migrants and refugees resided) erupted or why poor South Africans were not attacking each other with similar ferocity. The economic insecurity of the offenders may account for their extreme anxiety and heightened dissatisfaction, but it does not explain why only certain groups were and are singled out for deadly assault. Furthermore, if economic competition between poor residents and migrants is the underlying cause of aggressive hostility, it does not explain why wealthy and privileged groups, who do not face direct or even indirect competition from these migrants, also espouse these prejudices. When vicious attacks on migrants are conceived primarily as the outcome of material realities and economic competition between citizens and “foreigners”, then the frames of reference are automatically loaded against the latter. Seen in such terms, resentment and antipathy towards migrants and other outsiders become inevitable aspects of the social landscape, justifying stringent controls over immigration, and exclusion (or at best very limited inclusion) of migrants. This distinction invigorates the very idea that the presence of migrants and refugees poses a perpetual threat to “legitimate insiders”. Similarly, the crises of governance and frustrated hopes in South Africa, particularly at local levels, have little if anything to do with the presence of migrants. These connections need to be constructed more carefully to avoid reproducing the very prejudices that need to be confronted. One cannot deny that there is rivalry between locals and migrants. However, migrants represent a very small minority in terms of South Africa’s total population, and the detrimental effects of this economic competition have been seriously overstated. Both xenophobia denialism and xenophobia minimalism ignore or sideline the evidence that most South Africans hold extremely negative views about migrants and refugees and want the state to exercise greater coercive power to purge the country of their presence. The realists suggest, by contrast, that xenophobia is a pervasive phenomenon throughout South African society and that there is a predisposition to resort to violence on the part of a considerable number of South Africans. This viewpoint is based on systematic representative sampling of the South African population as a whole. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) has been monitoring the perceptions and attitudes of South Africans towards migrants and refugees since the late 1990s. These periodic surveys provide unequivocal evidence of deep-rooted and pervasive hostility and animosity towards migrants and refugees in the country. Three general findings are of relevance to our argument: (a) the nature and strength of myths about migrant and migration; (b) the level of public endorsement of coercive state measures to keep migrants out of the country and to remove those who are present; and (c) the degree of willingness to resort to coercion and violence against migrants. In this paper, we argue that xenophobia realism is the best way to make sense of the phenomenon of extreme xenophobia, that is, the translation of hostile attitudes into violent actions. We conceptualize extreme xenophobia as a heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is strongly embedded and expressed through aggressive acts directed at migrants and refugees. South Africans hold migrants responsible for crime, bringing disease, and “stealing” jobs, services and resources and view them as being illegally in the country. Moreover, perceptions of a rapid increase in the number of migrants intensify the levels of threat attached to them. Rights and entitlements for residents are directly and in a discriminatory fashion linked to migration and citizenship status, drawing the boundaries between those who are seen to belong and others who are not. High levels of migrant antipathy lead to recurrent episodes of violence. The primary challenge for xenophobia realists is to explain why, if hostility is so widespread, violence tends to be more confined, targeted at poorer neighbourhoods in the cities. First, whether and where animosity translates into actions depends on community-specific dynamics such as the nature of local leadership, the absence of dispute resolution mechanisms and the character of policing. Second, all of the common myths about migrants are offered by residents to explain why the attacks take place. Migration myths are not epiphenomena or post-hoc rationalizations; they have powerful mobilizing and animating effects spurring those who believe them into acts of extreme xenophobia. Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in the face of a large body of quantitative and qualitative research, it illustrates a continuing lack of political will to own the problem and act against one of the most destructive and anti-democratic forces in post-apartheid South Africa

Xenophobia, International Migration and Human Development

In the continuing discussion on migration and development, the vulnerability of all migrant groups to exploitation and mistreatment in host countries has been highlighted along with an emphasis on protecting their rights. However, xenophobia has not yet received explicit attention although anti-migrant sentiments and practices are clearly on the rise even in receiving countries in developing regions. Despite gaps in existing empirical work, research and anecdotal evidence exposes pervasive forms of discrimination, hostility, and violence experienced by migrant communities, with the latter becoming easy scapegoats for various social problems in host countries. This study attempts to insert xenophobia in this debate on migration and development by examining the growth of this phenomenon in host countries in the South. It provides short accounts of xenophobia witnessed in recent times in five countries including South Africa, India, Malaysia, Libya, and Thailand. The ambiguity surrounding the concept is discussed and crucial features that define xenophobia are outlined. A variety of methods to study it are likewise identified. Using a wide range of examples from diverse contexts, the paper explores possible reasons for the intensification of xenophobia. The final sections of the paper briefly outline the developmental consequences of rampant xenophobia for migrant and host populations while examining policy options to tackle it.Xenophobia; anti-immigrant prejudice; violence; intolerance; social exclusion; discrimination; migrant vulnerability; policy; South Africa, India, Libya, Thailand, Malaysia

No. 78: Comparing Refugees and South Africans in the Urban Informal Sector

This report compares the business operations of over 2,000 South Africans and refugees in the urban informal economy and systematically dispels some of the myths that have grown up around their activities. First, the report takes issue with the perception that South Africans are inexperienced and unmotivated participants in the informal economy. Many have years of experience and have successfully grown their businesses. Second, it contests the view that refugees enjoy a competitive advantage because they come to South Africa with inherent talent and already honed skills. On the contrary, over 80% of those surveyed had no prior informal sector experience and learned their skills on the job and after coming to South Africa. Third, the report shows that there is fierce competition in the urban informal sector between and within the two groups. However, business competition between refugees and South Africans is mitigated by the fact that they tend to dominate different sections of the informal economy with South Africans dominant in the food sector and refugees in the household products and personal services sectors. Finally, the report takes issue with recent arguments that all informal sector businesses are equally at risk from robbery, extortion and other crimes. It shows that South Africans are affected but that refugees are far more vulnerable than their South African counterparts. The report therefore confirms that xenophobia and xenophobic violence are major threats to refugees seeking a livelihood in the informal sector, especially if they venture into informal settlements

No. 76: Refugee Entrepreneurial Economies in Urban South Africa

More than 60% of the world’s refugees now live in urban areas, according to the UNHCR. The social and economic impacts of refugee movements are therefore increasingly being felt in the towns and cities of host nations. The notion of “refugee economies” has been adopted to highlight the strong involvement of refugees in the many overlapping processes of production, consumption, exchange and entrepreneurship. As urban refugees increasingly become the norm in the urbanizing Global South, more research on the specifically urban economic impacts of protracted refugee situations is therefore urgently needed. Identifying the economic advantages and benefits associated with the presence of refugees is a key precondition for making governments more responsive to refugee needs and removing the barriers they face. South Africa has adopted a “self-settlement” approach to refugees. The country imposes no restrictions on freedom of movement and the geographical locations where refugees can reside. They are not confined to refugee camps or physically separated from citizens, which means they have direct interaction with South Africans. The self-settlement model emphasizes self-sufficiency on the part of refugees in the process of resettlement, with little assistance from state authorities. Many urban refugees are unable, for various reasons, to access formal employment in the cities and turn to the informal economy for their livelihoods. Because urban informality is generally invisible to policy-makers, scorned by politicians, and seen as a site of desperation rather than opportunity, its economic significance is often minimized. The primary aim of this report is to examine what we call “refugee entrepreneurial economies” in urban South Africa. Within the informal sector, refugee enclaves have often been viewed as stagnant pools of desperation, providing narrow opportunities and limited scope for advancement. But this is a misleading characterization. It is important to recognize the dynamism and growing complexity of South African refugee economies and to reshape our ideas about their positive economic impacts. In this report, we seek to broaden the image of refugees and their economic impacts beyond a narrow focus on their marginal status and vulnerability. They are viewed as dynamic agents with skills and capabilities who can play an integral role in transforming local settings and contributing to economic development. The report also addresses the question of whether geographical location makes a difference to the nature of refugee entrepreneurial economies by contrasting refugee enterprise in a major South African city (Cape Town) with that in several smaller towns in a different part of the country (Limpopo province). Cape Town was chosen as one of two study sites because there is a significant concentration of refugees in the city. In 2015, SAMP conducted surveys of migrant entrepreneurs in Cape Town and Johannesburg and found that in Cape Town, one-third of the respondents were refugees. In recent years, refugee entrepreneurs have also been establishing businesses in smaller urban areas around the country. In contrast to Cape Town, very little research exists on refugee livelihoods and entrepreneurship in Limpopo, which was chosen as the second site for this study. The study focused only on informal sector business owners who hold refugee (Section 24) permits under the Refugees Act. Holders of asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits were not included as many of these migrants are unlikely to be refugees, as conventionally defined. In Cape Town, 504 refugees were interviewed in 12 different areas of the city using a survey instrument first developed by SAMP for the Growing Informal Cities Project. A similar number were interviewed in Limpopo in the towns of Polokwane, Musina, Louis Trichardt, Thohoyandou, Burgersfort and Tzaneen. In each of the two study sites, a “control group” of 500 South Africans was interviewed (1,000 in total). The survey was complemented with 50 in-depth interviews with business owners in each research location and three focus groups with refugees in each location. The first section of the report compares refugee business owners in Cape Town and small-town Limpopo to ascertain if there are any significant differences in their respective socio-demographic and migration profiles: Male refugee entrepreneurs clearly dominate in both areas, with only 20-25% of business owners being women; The entrepreneurs in both locations tend to be relatively young with 80% in Cape Town and 77% in Limpopo under the age of 40. Very few entrepreneurs in either location were over the age of 50. There are marked idfferences in the countries of origin of refugee entrepreneurs. In Cape Town, the most numerous group was from Somalia. While there were some Somali-owned businesses in Limpopo and Ethiopian-owned businesses in Cape Town, the largest group in Limpopo towns was from Ethiopia. Some national groups were well represented in both places, including from the DRC and Zimbabwe. In both Cape Town and Limpopo, there were small numbers of refugees from the same countries, notably Burundi, Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan. The majority of refugee business owners (over 90%0 arrived in South Africa after 2000. Limpopo has a slightly greater proportion of recent arrivals than Cape Town. In Limpopo, there is a clear time lag between year of migration to South Africa and year of arrival in the province. As many as 64% of the refugee entrepreneurs in Limpopo had lived in another South African town or city first (compared to only 27% in Cape Town). The major reason for relocation from large cities to small-town Limpopo is the pattern of violence against non-South African informal businesses. Experience of violent crime and fears over personal safety were recurrent motives for moving to Limpopo, which appears to be a safer haven and less inhospitable business environment than South Africa’s large cities. But while relocation to Limpopo may lessen the chances of victimization, it does not eliminate them. Many of the refugees interviewed in Limpopo told stories of being robbed and having their business premises destroyed. Police misconduct emerged as a greater problem for refugees in Limpopo. Despite being located in very different parts of South Africa, and nearly 2,000 km apart, the Cape Town and Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs engaged in a similarly wide range of economic activities. The vast majority in both locations are in the retail sector (75-79%), followed by services (25-28%) and manufacturing (4%-8%). The kinds of goods being sold and services offered are very similar as well. Among the sampled Limpopo refugee entrepreneurs, the most common items sold are clothing/footwear, confectionary, soft drinks, and toiletries/cosmetics. In Cape Town, the most common items sold are cigarettes, clothing/ footwear, personal accessories, and confectionary and beverages. Given the common perception among South African policy-makers that refugees and other migrants are driving South Africans out of business, it is of interest to see if they are selling the same kinds of goods. While no product category is the exclusive domain of either group, South Africans dominate the sale of fresh and cooked food and refugees are more likely to be selling footwear, personal accessories, electronics and household products. With regard to the business operations of refugees in the two locations, the main findings were as follows: The primary sources of business start-up capital in both areas were personal savings. Around 20% of both groups used loans from relatives, 12-14% loans from non-relatives and 12% gifts from relatives. Very few were able to access funding from banks, NGOs or the UNHCR. The main difference worth noting was that more entrepreneurs in Limpopo were able to access goods on credit with which to start their businesses. The most common strategies include bulk purchasing, extended hours of operation, keeping business records, negotiating prices with suppliers, allowing customers to buy goods on credit, and competitive prices. Refugees consult other entrepreneurs, suppliers and the media for information about the price of goods. There was very little difference in the frequency of use of business strategies by the two groups of refugees. Living in a large city does seem to provide more opportunity for buying in bulk, negotiating with suppliers and getting information on prices from other entrepreneurs. Almost a third of the Limpopo refugees travel to Johannesburg to purchase supplies, while most Cape Town refugees obtain their goods in the city. Although refugees in Limpopo are able to start a business with a smaller capital outlay than those in Cape Town, their enterprises are not as profitable. The Limpopo refugees earned less on average than their Cape Town counterparts: ZAR7,246 versus ZAR11,315 per month. In both Cape Town and Limpopo there are clear indications of increased business value with significant upward movement out of the lowest value category of less than ZAR5,000. The proportion of businesses in the ZAR50,000-plus value category increased from 27% to 47% in Cape Town and in Limpopo from 15% to 42%, suggesting that higher-value businesses may actually be performing better in Limpopo than in Cape Town. The establishment and growth of refugee businesses has economic spin-offs for a variety of South African stakeholders. The first beneficiaries are formal sector suppliers including wholesalers, supermarkets, fresh produce markets, retailers and manufacturers. Around two-thirds of the sampled refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo purchase supplies from wholesalers, who are easily the largest beneficiaries of their patronage. Refugees in Cape Town are also more likely to patronize supermarkets and factories while those in Limpopo are more likely to patronize small shops. The average monthly spend at wholesalers was very similar in both Cape Town and Limpopo (ZAR35,000). The second major beneficiary of the activities of refugee entrepreneurs is the South African treasury. While most businesses operate in the informal sector and are too small to pay income tax, they pay VAT on most goods purchased from formal sector suppliers and do not claim rebates. Third, as these refugees noted, they pay heavy rents to South African property owners. While over half of both groups of refugees paid rent to a private South African owner, this was more common in Limpopo (almost 66%). The average monthly rentals were very similar: ZAR4,838 in Cape Town and ZAR4,555 in Limpopo. Fourth, the municipal government has a direct financial interest in its dealings with refugees. Particularly in Cape Town, refugees pay into municipal coffers through rent for business sites. This amounted to 22% of the refugee entrepreneurs compared with only 4% in Limpopo. These rents were higher in Cape Town, an average of ZAR879 per month compared to only ZAR311 per month in Limpopo. Also, as many as 28% of Limpopo-based refugees (and 21% of those in Cape Town) pay an annual licence fee to the municipality. The cost of a business licence is much higher in Cape Town at ZAR1,959 per year compared to ZAR752 per year in Limpopo. Fifth, refugee businesses in the informal economy create jobs. Around half (52%) of the Cape Town refugee entrepreneurs and just under half (45%) of the Limpopo entrepreneurs employ people in their businesses. The Cape Town and Limpopo entrepreneurs were equally likely to employ South Africans (around 50% of the total number of jobs created). While the Limpopo entrepreneurs favoured female employees (51% versus 45% of total employees), both groups preferred to hire South African women than men (with 65-70% of South African employees in both sites being female). Finally, it is clear from the accounts of refugees in both Cape Town and Limpopo that one of the primary beneficiaries of their activities in the informal economy is the South African consumer who can access goods and services much more cheaply than from formal sector suppliers. These include necessities such as cheaper food for the food insecure, luxuries such as household and personal products, and services such as panel-beating

South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: • Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. • Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). • Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. • Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. • The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. • Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. • A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis